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The Empire Strikes Back.  Russian National Cinema After 2005Abstract
The article provides a critical analysis of the latest wave of Russian national 
cinema (2005-2013), considered one of the key instruments of Vladimir Putin’s 
nation-building cultural policy. The analysis, focused mostly on historical films 
and war films, reveals the concept of an ‘imperial nation’ as the main concept 
underlying this policy. The new Russian nation-concept binds various elements 
from two former Russian imperial traditions: the tradition of the Great Russian 
Empire and the Soviet tradition, thus trying to overcome the identity crisis in 
contemporary Russia.
Keywords: national cinema, Russian cinema, cinema and politics, imperial nation, 
politics of memory.
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The revival of Russian national cinema which could be observed in recent years, seems to be a powerful answer to the identity crisis in 
which the Russians found themselves after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
This particular attempt at overcoming the crisis by redefining Russian 
national identity is definitely the widest-ranging and most spectacular 
project carried out after 1991. Patriotic filmmaking has recently become 
one of the key instruments of Russian nation-building policy, generously 
subsidized with public money and strictly determined by the assumptions 
of the dominant cultural policy.
In the 1990s, the political elites of the newly created Russian Federation 
turned their attention to national identity issues with some delay, after a 
period of intense nostalgia for the just-collapsed Soviet Union. The politics 
of Russian nation-building in the Yeltsin era, based on the concept of 
rossijskij nation (the classic idea of ‘civic’ nation that was to form the basis for 
collective solidarity within the new territorial boundaries) and advocated by 
the president since 1994, was not implemented consistently. In spite of the 
‘civic’ rhetoric, Yeltsin was, in fact, constantly balancing between ‘ethnic’ 
and ‘civic’ nation-concept (Shevel, 2011, p. 190). Simultaneously, due to 
the main focus on social and economic problems resulting from the system 
transition to capitalism, he clearly neglected cultural policy. According to 
Jasmijn Van Gorp (2011, p. 250), critics of the president accused him of 
being late in recognizing the role of film as a key nation-builder, as well 
as of ineffective implementing the “Law on Cinematography”, formally 
introduced in 1996. Consequently, a great chaos in the system of Russian 
cinema-financing was a reflection of wavering cultural policy under 
Yeltsin’s presidency.
After coming to power in 2000, president Vladimir Putin initially seemed 
to continue the ambivalent nation-building policy of his predecessor. 
However, according to Vera Tolz (2004, p. 169), he understood much better 
the political importance of the identity issue. Convinced of the need to (re)
build Russian national identity as soon as possible, he made ‘the promotion 
of patriotism’ one of his policy’s priorities. Another one was, of course, the 
centralization of the country in order to fully concentrate the whole state 
power in the hands of the president. For Russian cinema this meant, on the 
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one hand, implementing a well-considered cultural policy followed by a 
serious increase in state-financing of film and, on the other, increasing state 
control over artistic production (Van Gorp, 2011, pp. 252–254).
Oxana Shevel claims that it was 2006 (during the anti-Georgian campaign 
preceding military intervention in that country) when the significant shift 
from the ‘civic’ rhetoric towards the concept of an ‘ethnic’ nation occurred 
and the adjective rossijskij was replaced by russkij in the language of the 
political elites (Shevel, 2011, p. 191). Simultaneously, as the state was 
constantly centralizing, the political sentiment for the imperial past of the 
Soviet Union was increasingly coming to the fore. This is probably the 
reason why some researchers, such as Emil Pain (2009, p. 75), characterize 
Putin’s policy after 2006 as ‘imperial nationalism’ which, on the one hand, 
seeks to rebuild a strong, authoritarian and potentially expansive state 
as a significant point of reference for the whole population of the former 
Soviet Union, while on the other it claims the right to protection of Russian 
minorities in these areas and determines the privileged role of the Russian 
ethnic majority within the current boundaries of the state.
Taking into consideration the variety of possible interpretations of the 
concept of ‘national cinema’ that range from open definitions stating that 
the concept includes every film made in a particular nation-state (White, 
2004, pp. 211–232), through definitions pointing at particular criteria that 
determine the national specificity (Hill, 1992, pp. 10–21), to more narrow 
definitions stressing the dimension of an ideological production (Higson, 
2002, pp. 52–68), we prefer the last interpretation. Thus, we understand 
‘national cinema’ as a current designed for proclaiming a coherent vision 
of collective identity, as well as to promoting a stable set of founding 
meanings and values (Higson, 2002, pp. 53–54). It is also worth noting 
that, although so understood Russian national cinema is primarily seen 
here as an instrument of Vladimir Putin’s nation-building policy, it would 
be a mistake to reduce the current solely to state propaganda. It appears 
to be rather an opportunity for the conservative Russian cultural elites1 
to express their minds within the general ideological assumptions of 
the nation-building policy. Political authorities affect the movie content 
indirectly, by subsidizing (mainly through the state Cinema Fund 
officially called ‘Federal Funding of Social and Economic Support for the 
National Film’) mainly those projects which fit the nation-building policy 
assumptions best.
1 Russian national cinema is being made by the most famous Russian mainstream film direc-
tors, such as Fyodor Bondarchuk, Nikita Mikhalkov or Vladimir Khotinenko as well as by the 
whole range of the second-class directors, such as Vladimir Bortko, Aleksandr Buravsky, Alek-
sandr Kott and more.
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In this paper, we reflect on the shape of the new Russian national 
identity that emerges from the latest wave of Russian national cinema, 
as well as on the founding values of this identity. Taking a closer look, 
we focused mostly on historical films and war films2 (leaving aside film 
adaptations of literary works as well as youth films3) as two genres which, 
in our opinion, offer the most coherent and wide-ranged vision of national 
identity. Furthermore, we took into account only films produced after 2005 
– mainly due to the fact that the particularly dynamic development of the 
Russian national cinema seems to go hand in hand with the aforementioned 
tightening of the political direction. The latest story of the Russian nation 
seems to be centered around three main pillar-concepts that interpenetrate 
in particular films. These are: the root, the essence and the difference.
The holy Empire
It is mostly historical film that is meant to provide a strong foundation 
for the new Russian national identity. However, the Russian variant of this 
genre seems to completely give up claims to represent any “objectivity” 
or “historical truth”, deliberately stylizing the past on a legend. During 
the infamous Time of Troubles (ros. smutnoye vremya) depicted in 1612 
(Mikhalkov & Khotinenko, 2007) directed by Vladimir Khotinenko, prince 
Dmitry Mikhaylovich Pozharsky, who tries to mobilize the Orthodox 
peasants to fight against the Polish-Lithuanian offensive, is constantly 
accompanied by a white unicorn symbolizing the forthcoming revival of the 
great Russian state. In Vladimir Bortko’s Taras Bulba (Zlatopol’skiĭ & Bortko, 
2009), the film that discusses the situation on the eve of the seventeenth-
century Polish-Cossack wars, Polish nobility measure themselves against 
a mythical hero – after all, the eponymous character is the ideal type of a 
Cossack Ataman. Finally, Andrei Smirnov in Zhila-byla odna baba (There 
was a woman; Prudnikova & Smirnov, 2011) inscribes the Russian myth 
of Kitezh, the underwater city4, into a social history of the collapse of the 
2 War film understood as a genre focused on the Great Patriotic War as well as on the Soviet war 
in Afghanistan.
3 The only exception here is Taras Bulba (2009), the adaptation of Nikolai Gogol’s novel under 
the same title; not only did we include Taras because he perfectly fits into the historical film genre, 
but also because the film is purposefully based on the second edition from 1842, turned by Gogol 
into the nationalist one.
4 According to the folk legend, in the 13th century the city of Kitezh was sank by God in the 
lake, together with all the praying inhabitants in order to ensure the eternal protection to the 
Russian people against the pagan Tatars. Kitezh would stay underwater until the whole world 
eventually turn into house of God.
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tsarist regime and the beginning of the October Revolution. In general, 
Russian historical film resembles a legend in which real historical events 
coexist harmoniously with the supernatural order, seemingly reserved only 
for folk tales.
The ‘historical fairy tale’ traces Russian national identity back to the 10th 
century, when, as we find out in Dmitry Korobkin’s Yaroslav. Tysyachu 
let nazad (Yaroslav. A Thousand years ago; Surkov & Korobkin, 2010), the 
Kievan prince Yaroslav the Wise lays the foundation for the future, multi-
ethnic Russian Empire. In the struggle with the pagan bandits, Orthodox 
Yaroslav stands as an uncompromising leader relentlessly suppressing all 
manifestations of devotion to any alternative social order. On the other 
hand, he is unusually willing to enter an alliance with those pagans who 
are ready to make concessions to him. For the pagans, he seems to be an 
enlightened ruler bringing a highly developed civilization to the wastelands. 
In Yaroslav…, Korobkin seems to legitimize Russia’s territorial conquests 
(starting with the medieval Kievan Rus’) by presenting them in terms of 
‘friendly expansionism’ – smaller and weaker communities voluntarily give 
themselves up to the protection of Russia since they recognize the alliance as 
advantageous. Not only does the director argue that the idea of the Russian 
Empire existed from time immemorial, but also claims that it was based 
not so much on authoritarian rule, but rather on a peaceful coexistence of 
different cultures.
At the same time, there is no doubt that the very core of the Russian 
Empire is solely made up of the indigenous people. Introducing Herald 
– a character of Varangian origin – and making him a close ally of Yaroslav 
who eventually turns out to be a traitor, Korobkin strikingly dissociates 
himself from the popular thesis of the Nordic origin of the Rurik dynasty5. 
He claims that the first Russian princes were most certainly indigenous 
Slavs. Furthermore, Zaporozhian Kossacks from Bortko’s Taras Bulba 
or even the hundreds of Orthodox Slavs from the works of Khotinenko 
and Smirnov, seem to be equally indigenous as Yaroslav’s people. All 
the filmmakers firmly argue that the Russian man is not a stranger in his 
own land.
The element of fundamental importance in bonding the Empire together, 
but first of all in justifying its very existence, seems to be Orthodox religion. 
Highly significant scenes, in which the pagans conclude the alliance with 
Yaroslav under the Orthodox cross, Taras Bulba’s Cossacks get killed with 
‘Russian Orthodox faith’ on their lips, and the end of the Time of Troubles 
is preceded by the prophecy uttered by the Orthodox monk, make the 
5 Although this thesis seems to be highly unattractive to the Russian nationalists, at the same 
time it is seriously taken by some historians; see more: Fomin (2005).
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Russian ‘historical fairy tale’ a sacred story. The Russian Empire, equated 
with the Holy Land, appears now as a perfect form of statehood. Belonging 
to it is the supreme honour and dying in its defence is fulfilling the noble 
duty. Furthermore, depicting the state in terms of the Holy Empire seems to 
be a way of legitimizing arbitrary actions within the process of law-making. 
Since the state law becomes synonymous with religious dogma, it cannot be 
liable either to rational analysis, or any criticism.
Besides, it is worth noting that in Russian national cinema the category 
of ‘faith’ goes far beyond the realm of religion. Film directors seem to 
be inevitably guided by the famous motto of Fyodor Tyutchev stating 
that [Russia’s] soul is of a special kind, by faith alone appreciated6. Thus, 
‘faith’ seems to be the only factor that could explain the Russian ‘national 
past’ – from the dawn of history until today. Consequently, it is the main 
motivation that drives each and every action taken by film characters.
The Russian hero
On the foundations of the Holy Empire, a modern Russian national 
community is to grow. Her constitutive elements exposed by Russian 
national cinema seem to be directly derived from the heritage of the Soviet 
Union. Although they appear repeatedly in each of the analysed films, it 
is war cinema focused on the Great Patriotic War (22 June 1941 – 9 May 
1945) that definitely plays a major role here. The war triumph is selected 
to be a defining moment for the modern Russian nation, thus being a 
simple continuation of the Soviet rhetoric which also consistently glorified 
this victory.
Russian directors seem to agree on how to interpret the very beginning 
of the war. According to them, the idyll of harmonious Soviet life was 
destroyed by the treacherous attack of the fascist aggressor. In a single 
moment, the quiet and peaceful life of Russian troops (first of all, they 
appear as exemplary husbands and fathers, and only next are they political 
officers) in Brestskaya krepost’ (The Brest Fortress; Ugol’nikov & Kott, 2010) 
by Aleksandr Kott, falls apart. The same German raid in Match (Match; 
Neretin & Maliukov, 2012) by Sergei Bezrukov, brutally interrupts the 
6 This is the fragment of the famous Fyodor Tyutchev’s quotation from 1866: Who would grasp 
Russia with the mind? / For her no yardstick was created / Her soul is of a special kind / By faith 
alone appreciated (trans. by John Dewey); the quotation has been used, among others, by Nikolai 
Berdayev to explain the ‘Russian mentality’, see more: Berdiaev (2010). It became the cultural 
motto which was to illustrate the ‘Russian irrationality’ as the primary way of interpreting the 
whole Russian history.
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nascent love between Anna and Nikolai – the latter being a rising football 
star, the Russian goalkeeper of Ukrainian FC Dynamo Kyiv. Russia7 – an 
innocent victim of the aggression – is then brutally forced to defend the 
last outposts in the interior of the country, as in Fyodor Bondarchuk’s 
Stalingrad (Mel’kumov & Bondarchuk, 2013) or Aleksandr Buravsky’s 
Leningrad (Mel’kumov & Buravskiĭ, 2009).
Filmmakers of Russian national cinema seem to argue that the limits of 
heroism actually do not exist, but also that each and every Russian is ready 
to sacrifice his life for the sake of the Homeland. The Red Army soldiers 
invariably turn out to be the avant-garde of heroism – they repeatedly 
charge on tanks only with a shovel in their hands8, and they commit 
‘patriotic suicides’ – both individual and collective – in order to take a few 
more fascists together with them to the grave, either to prevent the enemy 
from gaining a strategic stronghold9 or even to prevent their own family 
members from falling into the hands of the fascist slaughterers10. Military 
heroism is widely supplemented by countless examples of civilian heroism 
of women and children. The latter is best illustrated by militiawoman Nina 
from Leningrad, who is constantly helping the civilians to escape from the 
besieged city and rescuing them from dying of starvation. Another good 
example can be Sasha Akimov, a twelve-year-old cadet from Brestskaya 
krepost’ who miraculously manages to take away the red banner from the 
besieged fortress, thus saving, in fact, the symbol of an ultimate victory11. 
Obviously, the depiction of Russia as war victim additionally sanctifies 
every heroic death, giving it the status of a morally right act.
Not only do all the mentioned operations aim at constructing an 
inclusive model of an everyman-hero (allowing every spectator to identify 
himself with such a concept – at least to some extent), but they also seem 
7 Nowadays, the Great Patriotic War is entirely inscribed into Russian national narrative; the 
name of ‘the Soviet Union’ never appears in any of the analysed films – it is completely replaced 
by the notion of Homeland.
8 Those scenes clearly correspond with the best traditions of the Soviet cinema: Sergey Bondar-
chuk’s Oni srazhalis za rodinu (They fought for the homeland, 1976), Yuri Ozerov’s Osvobozhdenie 
(The Liberation, 1969), Aleksandr Ivanov’s Soldaty (The Soldiers, 1956).
9 Perhaps best illustrated in Stalingrad. The entire film plot develops around the small squad of 
Russian soldiers who defend the ruined house near the Volga river. In the last scene, the survi-
ving soldiers who are no longer able to resist the Germans, decide to commit mass suicide – after 
asking the Soviet aircraft to bomb their own positions, they are buried alive during the air raid.
10 Perhaps best illustrated in Brestskaya krepost’, when colonel Kizhevatov, after finding himself 
in a hopeless situation, commits a suicide together with his wife.
11 Krasnoye Znamya (The Banner of Victory) is the banner raised by the Red Army soldiers on 
the Reichstag in Berlin on the day that Adolf Hitler committed suicide (30 April 1945); nowadays, 
Krasnoye Znamya as a symbol of victory in the Great Patriotic War, is annually presented during 
the celebrations of Dien Pobiedy (The Victory Day) in Moscow, 9th May.
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to try to establish the national monolith as the main collective character 
of each of these stories. At this point, Russian national cinema follows 
the well-known scheme borrowed from the Soviet cinema. It emphasizes 
communitarian, collective values over liberal, individual ones, thus 
marginalizing the psychology of the film characters and submitting all their 
actions to realization of the main collective purpose, namely – defence of 
the Homeland. Consequently, all the individual destinies intertwine into 
one collective national destiny, thus achieving a perfect unity. In such 
an order, where everyone perfectly knows his or her place, loyalty to the 
comrades becomes the supreme value. When Taras Bulba shoots his own 
son for treason and fighting against “his own”, he even puts this loyalty 
over family. In the face of consolidated collective power (embodied in 
Gorod-geroy of Leningrad, Krepost’-geroy of Brest, etc12.) not only does 
the enemy have to inevitably surrender, but so do the forces of nature – 
in starving Leningrad it is only the effort of a collective will that seems 
to overcome them, thus preventing the people from turning into beasts. 
Although the food rations constantly decrease, they do not fight at all costs 
for every slice of bread, but rather distribute what they have among all 
members of the community. On the other hand, nature itself visibly helps 
the Russians to survive. It becomes mostly clear in the opening scene of 
Nikita Mikhalkov’s Utomlyonnye solntsem 2: Tsitadel (Burnt by the Sun 
2: Citadel; Mikhalkov, 2011) when a mosquito saves the life of a Russian 
soldier and then a spider distracts a German sniper trying to shoot a band 
of unarmed civilians. Furthermore, Mikhalkov in Utomlyonnye solntsem 
2: Predstoyanie (Burnt by the Sun 2: Exodus; Mikhalkov, 2010) proves that 
the evident contradiction between the forces of nature and God is not at 
all a problem for him. He suggests that it is only divine custody over the 
just-baptized daughter of the main character that saves her from drowning 
in the sea. Thus, the Russians seem to be protected by the whole universe – 
natural, as well as supernatural.
The basic principle that internally organizes the national monolith, 
seems to be egalitarianism. Obviously, in the national cinema the best 
embodiment of egalitarianism is the Red Army, in the ranks of which people 
of various cultures and religions from all over the Soviet Union fight and 
die alongside ethnic Russians. Besides cultural affinity, struggle in defence 
of the homeland transcends also gender and age, equally involving old men, 
women and children, such as the aforementioned Nina from Leningrad or 
Sasha from Brestskaya krepost’. Finally, when it comes to the issue of social 
origin, Russian national cinema faithfully reproduces the Soviet rhetoric. 
12 The Hero City, the Hero Fortress – honorary title awarded by Soviet authorities for exceptional 
heroism during the Great Patriotic War; the term is widely used in today’s Russia as well.
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If the question of origin is raised, the main character always turns out to 
be a commoner. Not only does it apply to Lyuty, a poor youngster from 
the orphanage who is the only one to survive the offensive of Afghan 
fundamentalists in Fyodor Bondarchuk’s 9 rota (The 9th Company; 
Matila & Bondarchuk, 2005), but also to the peasant Andreyka from 1612. 
Andreyka is the only main fictional character who eventually outshines all 
the historical characters presented in the film. It seems that the director 
introduces him in order to marginalize the role of the boyars in stirring 
up a popular uprising that ended the Time of Troubles, thus empowering 
the folk.
Filmmakers of Russian national cinema seem to be deeply convinced 
both of the uniqueness of their own national monolith (after all, There 
was nowhere such an alliance as there was on Russian soil [Taras Bulba 
00:00:53; Zlatopol’skiĭ & Bortko, 2009]) and of its eternity. On the one 
hand, Soviet values are sometimes projected onto the distant past, while on 
the other, they are indicated as crucial for further generations. The latter 
becomes mostly clear in Stalingrad and Brestskaya krepost’ which strongly 
emphasize the crucial role of an intergenerational message which should 
confer immortality upon the nation.
Enemies of Russian Civilization
Regardless of the fact that Russian national cinema does not set clear 
boundaries of its own community (actually, one can be pretty sure that 
they lie far beyond the borders of the contemporary Russian Federation, 
although it is difficult to say whether they coincide more with the area of 
the former Soviet Union or rather the area where the Orthodox religion 
is dominant), the filmmakers are able to doubtlessly describe ‘the Other’. 
While the basic characteristic of each ‘Other’ appearing in the films seems 
to be its immanent enemy-status, the same enemy-status is liable to 
gradation.
It is fully understandable that the Tatars were assigned the role of the 
least dangerous enemy, having only the status of an amusing curiosity – 
after all, this group has not posed a threat to Russia for several centuries. 
For the same reason, as it seems, Russian national cinema marginalizes 
the Poles, perceiving them – at best – as a poor imitation of the West. 
Although in historical film, both the medieval Mongolian State and the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth periodically threaten Russian political 
boundaries, at the same time they seem to be completely uninterested in 
strangling ‘Russianness’. Consequently, the East appears to be mostly a 
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distant object of misunderstanding (as in Orda; Kravets & Proshkin, 2012, 
by Andrei Proshkin) or simply of mockery (as in Taras Bulba; Zlatopol’skiĭ 
& Bortko, 2009), while Poland seems to be the land of hypocrisy, deceit and 
excessive ambitions of the local nobility. Not only are the Polish noblemen 
(vividly portrayed particularly in 1612; Mikhalkov & Khotinenko, 2007), 
greedy, cynical and power-hungry, but most of all they feel unreasonably 
superior to the Russian people, no matter – peasants or aristocracy. In 
turn, the Polish Catholic priest is not only a devoted servant of the Pope, 
devoid of any spirituality and humbly filling his most ridiculous orders, but 
he also constantly incites his ward, Tsarevna Xenia Borisovna, to treason 
by converting her to Catholicism. Eventually, after being humbled by the 
wisdom of the Orthodox monk who, much in advance, predicts the failure 
of the Poles, the Catholic priest finally realizes that his helplessness in trying 
to understand Russia does not result from Russia’s alleged wilderness, 
but rather from the limitations of his own (implicitly: Western) way of 
perceiving the world. He is not able to go beyond the rational categories 
that turn out to be completely inapplicable to Russia. 
The actual threat to the national community seems to be not so much 
the aforementioned political enemy, but rather the civilizational enemy, 
which – either in the form of German fascists or Islamic fundamentalists 
– aims at annihilating the very existence of the nation. Despite a number 
of common features that serve equally to create the image of the fascists 
and the Taliban as dehumanized Evil (both enemies take the form of a 
black, boundless and nameless crowd, wreaking destruction and flooding 
the Russian defence positions with a sea of fire), the key difference lies, 
however, in reference to the civilizational order. Namely, the fascist enemy 
symbolizes the civilization of evil, while the Islamic enemy represents lack 
of any civilization at all.
As a consequence of inscribing the anti-fascist struggle into the 
civilizational struggle between Good and Evil, the fascist in the war film 
– whether a German or a Ukrainian13 – appears as the moral enemy 
that constitutes the complete opposite to a Russian. Despite introducing 
single fascist characters who are doubtful if they actually going the right 
way – the case of Stalingrad or Leningrad – the boundaries of the national 
13 The ambivalent attitude towards the Ukrainians seems to be worth noting here, as it reflects 
the ambivalence in Russian rhetoric during the political crisis in Ukraine (February – April 
2014); on the one hand – as in Myatch – a Ukrainian appears as a fascist collaborator, conformist 
and hypocrite who cheats on Russians, and on the other – as in Taras Bulba – Zaporozhian Cos-
sacks are not portrayed as proto-Ukrainians (which would go in line with the current Ukrainian 
politics of memory), but rather as Russian patriots; by depicting a Ukrainian either as a fascist or 
as a Russian, the national cinema produces a double symbolic legitimacy for the real expansion 
into Ukraine.
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community always remains impassable and ‘a good German’ remains an 
unknown category to Russian national cinema. Furthermore, victory over 
the civilization of evil takes almost a mythical form – not only is the enemy 
defeated by the unique attributes possessed by the national community, but 
also he is defeated forever.
In turn, the anti-Islamic struggle is inscribed into the struggle 
between civilization and barbarity, the latter represented primarily by the 
fundamentalists from Afghanistan14. Not only is a member of the Taliban a 
masked terrorist, who – as in Fyodor Bondarchuk’s 9 rota – attacks out of 
nowhere, or – as in Sergei Makhovikov’s Tikhaya zastava (The Quiet Post; 
Konovalov, Fedorova, & Makhovikov, 2011) – turns Russian women into 
Islamic terrorists, or – as in Andrei Kavun’s Kandagar (Kandahar; Neretin, 
Todorovskiĭ, & Kavun, 2010) – kidnaps a Russian plane, thus performing 
a symbolic attack on the state, but he is also a wild beast. A Taliban lives 
in a filthy mud hut, feeds on half-raw meat, beats his wife and murders 
his companions. In contrast to fascists, whose offensive looked more like 
a single occurrence, a hurricane, the Afghan guerrillas pose a permanent 
threat, constantly pulsating on the outskirts of Russian everyday life.
While the anti-fascist struggle reveals the crystalline good inherent in 
the Russian national community, the anti-Islamic struggle rather exposes 
the superiority of Russian civilization. In Tikhaya zastava, where Russian 
soldiers sew shoes for the poor Afghan child, and in Kandahar, where the 
Taliban learn from the captured pilots how to play football, the Russians 
appear to be the enlightened mentors, who carry the civilizing mission into 
the darkness of barbarism.
Conclusions
Recent Russian national cinema seems to offer a vision of ‘Russianness’ 
as a synthesis of selected elements from the two imperial traditions and for 
this reason it could be called ‘imperial nation’. On the one hand, the new 
Russian identity is to be rooted in the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire 
– the sanctified Orthodox land where, since the early Middle Ages, all the 
indigenous cultures peacefully coexist under the leadership of the equally 
indigenous ethnic Russians. On the other, the key reference point for the 
present time seems to be the legacy of the Soviet Union, mostly condensed 
in the Great Patriotic War story. Furthermore, such Russian identity seems 
14 Thus, the Russian national cinema inscribes the war in Afghanistan from the 80s into the 
current – both Russian and American – rhetoric of ‘war against terrorism’; by establishing this 
continuity, the Russians may appear as the world pioneers of this war.
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to be founded not only on an unwavering faith in its own uniqueness and 
inherent might, but also on the conviction of moral superiority over the 
West and civilizational superiority over the barbaric world of Islam.
It seems that analysing recent Russian national cinema can be an aid in 
better understanding the assumptions of Vladimir Putin’s nation-building 
policy after 2006. Taking into account the category of ‘imperial nation’ as the 
main symbolic reference point of this policy, one may be far less surprised 
by the broad social legitimacy for the authoritarian policy pursued by the 
current president. References
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Imperium kontratakuje.  Rosyjskie kino narodowe  po 2005 roku
Artykuł zajmuje się krytyczną analizą filmów najnowszej fali rosyjskiego 
kina narodowego (2005-2013), uważanej tu za jedno z kluczowych narzędzi 
polityki kulturalnej Władimira Putina obliczonej na budowanie narodu. 
Autorzy artykułu skupiają się przede wszystkim na filmie historycznym 
i wojennym, odsłaniając pojęcie „imperialnego narodu” jako konceptu 
stojącego u podstaw oficjalnej polityki. Nowe rosyjskie pojęcie narodu łączy 
w sobie dwie tradycje rosyjskie: tradycję Imperium Rosyjskiego oraz tra-
dycję Związku Radzieckiego, próbując w ten sposób przezwyciężyć kryzys 
tożsamościowy współczesnej Rosji.
Słowa kluczowe: kino narodowe, kino rosyjskie, film i polityka, imperialny 
naród, polityka pamięci.
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